University of Nebraska at Omaha

DigitalCommons@UNO
Religion Faculty Publications

Department of Religion

3-17-2021

Christian Realism and the State as Idol: Feminist and Postcolonial
Critique and Christian Realist Theology in an Interdependent
World
Laura E. Alexander

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/relfacpub
Part of the Religion Commons

Christian Realism and the State as Idol:
Feminist and Postcolonial Critique and
Christian Realist Theology in an
Interdependent World
Laura E. Alexander, Department of Religious Studies, University of Nebraska at
Omaha, Omaha, NE, USA

ABSTRACT

At a time of outspoken nationalism, Christian realism accurately diagnoses idolatry of
the state as a political and theological problem. The power of sovereign states protects
self-determination but can allow states to unjustly oppress members of minority groups.
From a Christian realist perspective, states’ power relative to other institutions can
encourage religious idolatry, with citizens devoting their ultimate loyalty to a state. To
mitigate this problem, Christian realism argues for recognition of states’ limitations.
However, Christian realism itself remains beholden to a notion of states’ sovereign
agency rooted in an incomplete picture of human nature. Recent feminist and
postcolonial scholarship on human relationality shows how state sovereignty and
agency are modified by relationships within networks of local, national, and global
institutions. This analysis enriches Christian realist critiques of idolatry of the state. It
argues for recognition of the role of grassroots communities and enhanced cooperation
among states and other institutions.
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Introduction: vulnerability in a system of nation-states
In July 2018, the journalist Margarite Clarey interviewed members of the Rohingya
Muslim community who had been violently expelled from villages in the Rakhine state
of Myanmar and forced into squalid refugee camps in Bangladesh. Clarey recounts the
following conversations:
They raped our mothers and sisters and stopped us from following our religion.
We are religious people, we want to follow our religion. And we need nationality.
If you give me these two things right now, I’ll go [back to Myanmar] straight
away,” said former teacher Mohammad Ruhim.

Above all, the Rohingya people I spoke to in the camps want the rights and
protection that they believe will only come with the Myanmar government
recognizing them as citizens of Myanmar.
“Which nationality do you have?” Rohingya community health worker Abdul
Kalom asked my young Bangladeshi interpreter. “See,” he said staring at her
firmly, “you have an identity and so you have power. We have no identity, and
that is why we have no power.1
Ruhim and Kalom’s point is that the Rohingya are unable to find security, or recourse
after immense suffering, because they have no recognized nationality and no state
willing to protect them. Myanmar does not consider the Rohingya to be citizens and has
used that lack of status as one justification for pushing 730,000 members of the group
out of the country, preventing most Rohingya from voting or running for office, and
severely restricting both movement and access to basic needs like healthcare.2
Other countries and the United Nations have not been able to stop what many
rights groups are calling a genocide. The International Court of Justice did order
Myanmar to take measures to protect the Rohingya from genocide after a case was
brought by The Gambia.3 But Myanmar blocked U.N. humanitarian aid to Rakhine State
shortly after the crisis began, and the U.N. Security Council has produced only a few
strongly worded statements; it has not imposed significant consequences or crafted
serious diplomatic solutions.4 A major reason for inaction is that China, which has
political and economic interests in Myanmar, has used its veto power on the Security
Council to block any significant proposals.5 Humanitarian organizations, meanwhile, can
only provide the most basic aid. They cannot change the conditions that make the
community so vulnerable in the first place, and they often must tread extremely carefully
to avoid seeming to challenge the government and being themselves threatened or
expelled.6 Here, it appears that a single state has the power to kill thousands7 and
displace hundreds of thousands without much consequence, while another state can
forestall actions from the international community that might mitigate the crisis.
The suffering of the Rohingya community points to a dilemma that plagues many
efforts to do justice and enhance human well-being in the contemporary global order.
The world is becoming increasingly globalized, yet refugees, minority communities, and
stateless persons can suffer greatly at the hands of a single state, with little recourse.
The problem is exacerbated by increased prominence of vocally nationalist overnments
that view themselves as responsible to almost no one outside their borders and
only some groups within.8 The old question of the “right to have rights,” articulated

1Clarey, “Facing the Future.”
2Naing, “Rohingya politicians excluded.”
3Human Rights Watch, “International Court of Justice Orders Burmese Authorities to Protect Rohingya
Muslims from Genocide.”
4Khan and Ahmed, “Dealing with the Rohingya Crisis,” 126.
5Ibid., 124.
6Nilsen, “Perception of Rights and the Politics of Humanitarian Aid in Myanmar,” 339–40.
7Barron, “More than 43,000 Rohingya Parents May Be Missing. Experts Fear They Are Dead.” Exact
numbers are hard to come by, but thousands of Rohingya are missing, and it seems clear that most of the
missing are dead.
8Bieber, “Is Nationalism on the Rise,” 520, 522, 528, 537.

poignantly by Hannah Arendt,9 remains: how can human rights and dignity be
universally protected, when one’s ability to enjoy one’s rights depends on secure
membership in a state willing to do the protecting?
The contemporary global order to which states have ascribed, outlined in the
Charter of the United Nations, purports to promote both self-determination of states and
fundamental human rights.10 Yet in cases like that of the Rohingya, the two
commitments seem to clash, with poor outcomes for people’s well-being. States do
protect the well-being of many, but when vulnerable groups must rely solely on
individual states for their protection and instead end up in harm’s way, it is worth
exploring alternative conceptions of states’ agency and relationships to other
institutions.

A Christian realist lens
This essay undertakes such an exploration. Specifically, it lays out a Christian realist
approach to contemporary ideologies of the state and offers ideas for how the scholarly
tradition of Christian realism can better comprehend and address problems of human
well-being in a globalized world of sovereign states. The argument is this: from a
Christian realist perspective, idolatry of the state gives rise to injustice and harms
human wellbeing. States have overwhelming power in relation to other institutions and
communities that shape human life, and citizens and residents of states are encouraged
to – and often do – invest their ultimate loyalty in their state. In contemporary political
imagination, the fact that states have sovereign power politically is easily elided into a
religious idolatry that views states as unfettered agents who can claim their people’s
absolute devotion and do as they please, with no proper check on their actions beyond
self-interest. The power held by states provokes a temptation to idolatry; idolatry in turn
motivates members and leaders of states to seek even more power for their own state.
This idolatry is expressed explicitly in the rhetoric of nationalist politicians, but it also
implicitly informs decisions made by governing authorities, populations, and diplomats,
which is particularly troubling in cases where a vulnerable group is oppressed by a
sovereign state.
The hegemony of this idea of the state is not consonant with the deepest insights
of Christian realism for promoting justice in the political order. The purpose of the state
is to promote human well-being by providing order, protection, and the material and
social goods that allow people to live reasonably stable lives and pursue good and
meaningful ends. A Christian realist conception of the state recognizes that states can
properly use coercive power and claim a sufficient measure of their subjects’ loyalty to
fulfill that purpose. But the state is not itself an ultimate end to be pursued, or an
ultimate authority that merits people’s highest loyalty. States’ promotion of their
interests, and their use of sovereign power, remain subject to critique from a higher
moral plane.
However, Christian realism has not fully leveraged this critique in our moment.
Christian realism itself remains beholden to a notion of the agency of sovereign states
that is rooted in an incomplete picture of human nature. Recent feminist and
9Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 296–9. See also Benhabib, The Rights of Others, Ch. 2.
10Charter of the United Nations, Preamble and Chapter 1, Articles 1-2.

postcolonial scholarship enriches a Christian realist perception of how sovereign states
exercise agency, and thus enhances Christian realist analysis of current global affairs. It
does this by pointing out that state sovereignty and agency are relational by nature,
because human beings are relational by nature. Incorporating this relational conception
of states’ agency provides Christian realism with a firmer basis for describing and
pushing back against idolatry of the state, and it opens up new possibilities for
considering how human well-being might be promoted through the cooperative action of
states with and alongside other communities and institutions.

Niebuhr’s Christian realism: states’ capacity for justice
Contemporary Christian realist thought both describes and resists idolatry of the state.
Christian realism in its present-day form is most associated with the writings of Reinhold
Niebuhr; for this analysis I will primarily engage Niebuhr’s work and contemporary
scholarship that draws on it. Niebuhr proposes two Christian realist solutions to the
problem of idolatry of the state. The first is a balance of power between institutions, so
that no single institution holds too much power or claims too much loyalty. Although
Niebuhr’s balance of power is often a balance between different states, he can also
refer to balancing state power with the power of local or global institutions. Later
Christian realists have taken this idea of balance farther, by more deeply examining the
variety of instituteons that bear on human lives and the relationships between them. The
second goal Niebuhr says Christian realists should aim at is encouraging humility from
policymakers, citizens, and intellectuals who seek to promote justice using state power.
Niebuhr’s examination of the international political order is rooted in his
theological conception of the human condition. For Niebuhr, human beings are
conscious, spiritual beings who are able to transcend and reflect on our immediate
circumstances. Yet we are vulnerable, to pain and death as well as to the good or evil
caused by chance – what Niebuhr calls the “vicissitudes” of nature.11 As spiritual
creatures, human beings are conscious of our creaturely limitations and transcend them
in our creativity and imagination, yet we remain subject to them. The contrast between
the ability to rise above our immediate circumstances, and our continued vulnerability to
them, causes a deep-seated anxiety.12 That anxiety, in turn, leads us to
sin by seeking inordinate worldly possessions and power, in a vain effort to overcome
our limitations.13 This striving for possessions and power almost always harms the
individuals and communities around us, since we tend to run roughshod over others as
we seek our own good, and we use whatever power we gain in unjust ways.14
In contrast to the human tendency to favor our own good and seek power over
others, Niebuhr argues that the moral demand placed on Christians is a demand of
“agapic” love: seeking others’ good to the point of self-denial.15 This demand is
11Niebuhr, Nature and Destiny Vol. I, 3–4, 26–27.
12Ibid., 182.
13Ibid., 16, 137–8.
14Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society, 6–11.
15Niebuhr, Nature and Destiny Vol. II, 71, 246.

impossible for an individual to achieve in all moments, even if a few people can manage
it sometimes, with God’s help.16 And states, as institutions that ought to protect the wellbeing of their populations, cannot really be subject to such a demand. If authorities
choose to disregard the good of their political community in order to seek the well-being
of another individual or community, they are not (only) making a personal sacrifice but
are forcing others – those over whom they have authority – to forego their own wellbeing. That is not agape, since disregarding the well-being of someone else is a very
unloving act. For all his critique of overzealous patriotism and the ease with which
individual egoism is multiplied in political communities,17 Niebuhr never called on states
to give up the power to protect their populations.
What states, and other political institutions, can do is seek justice. For Niebuhr,
justice in the political order, whether national or global, involves using human reason to
properly weigh and balance the interests of individuals and communities.18 By placing
checks upon the power that individuals or groups hold over each other, a just system
restrains any single person or group, including the state and its authorities, from sinfully
oppressing others.19 Some measure of coercion by those in authority is needed to
promote the “rational and moral” end of equal justice for diverse individuals and groups
in a society, but justice limits coercion as much as possible and subjects it to oversight,
so that the power to promote equality does not become overweening power to promote
the selfish ends of a few.20

Justice and balance of power
The first answer to the problem of idolatry of the state is therefore a balance of power,
not only between states, but also among institutions at different levels of authority.
When Niebuhr considers international institutions as a potential counterbalance to the
United Nations could provide a clearinghouse for a minimal level of oversight of states’
use of power, a “social and political review.”22 It could also offer a platform for improved
dialogue among states and encourage a stronger “voice” for less-powerful states.
Niebuhr thinks this will help “western nations” better recognize their limitations and the
moral failures that accompany even well-intentioned actions.23
Niebuhr does not seem to think the United Nations would ever command much
loyalty. However, he does believe that people might be able to temper their loyalty to
states with a commitment to the moral ideals represented by the attempt to gather
states around dialogue and a shared pursuit of limited moral goals. Niebuhr is well
aware that states’ policies will always be primarily driven by the “collective self-interest”
of their people, yet our loyalties cannot rightly stop at the borders of the state: “Loyalty
to the community is…morally tolerable only if it includes values wider than those of the
16Niebuhr, Nature and Destiny Vol. I, 286–7.
17Niebuhr, Moral Man, 91-92.
18Niebuhr, Nature and Destiny of Man Vol. II, 248–9.
19Ibid., 257–8; Niebuhr, Children of Light and Children of Darkness, viii, 178.
20Niebuhr, Moral Man, 234, 238–9.
21Niebuhr, Irony, 136.
22Ibid., 136.
23Ibid., 137.

community.”24 Those who ascribe to Christian realist principles must not be drawn into
“complacent acceptance of national loyalty as the final moral possibility of history.”25
Niebuhr speaks less often of balancing power and loyalty between the state and
local or grassroots communities. Yet his examinations of the labor movement26 and the
Civil Rights movement27 approvingly describe a balance between the power of the state
and of locally organized communities. Labor and civil rights activists seek policy change
at the national level, but it is not the state to which their loyalty and energy is directed; it
is to the ideals of their movements, and to the gathered communities that push those
movements forward. Recent Christian realist thinkers, described by Robin Lovin as
“Pluralist Realists,” have fleshed out the argument that human beings seek good
through multiple kinds of institutions,28 of which local movements can be one.29 States
cannot protect human well-being and promote justice in every possible way, and
sometimes they actively undermine well-being. Grassroots organizations rightly claim a
measure of loyalty from their members. As long as these organizations, like any
institution, remain within their own proper limits and seek justice, they can also set their
own power in opposition to abuses of power by the state and can justly seek to
persuade, even sometimes compel, governmental authorities into policy change.

Justice and humility in wielding power
The second Christian realist answer that Niebuhr provides to the problem of idolatry of
the state is a good dose of humility on the part of governmental authorities and anyone
who seeks to shape policies. States are fallible, and their use of power, even with good
intentions in the service of justice, very easily leads to injustice. An idolatrous loyalty to
a particular state, or even to “the state” as an institution and the contemporary
international order of states, makes it impossible to maintain a posture of humility about
the capabilities of states or to critique a state properly when it goes astray. In Niebuhr’s
view this would be true of any political institution. But in the contemporary political order,
this caution most clearly applies to states as the most powerful, sovereign institutions.
In a Christian realist conception, states’ purpose is to order human life so as to
provide peace, security, and a measure of justice.30 States contribute to human
flourishing in the ways proper to political governance and authority. Robin Lovin argues
that the state has the “limited” task “of securing peace and security within a given
territory.”31 For Lovin, Christian realism, as a type of moral realism, distinguishes itself
from political realism by positing an ideal of human flourishing from which states and
their governing authorities cannot stray too far. It is not simply a question of paying
attention to the full range of interests that political authorities must balance; it is a
question of whether authorities promote the goods that human beings fundamentally
24Ibid., 36–7.
25Ibid., 144.
26Ibid., 31.
27Niebuhr, Moral Man, 252–3.
28Schweiker, Theological Ethics and Global Dynamics, 30–1.
29Lovin, Christian Realism and the New Realities, 37–42.
30Niebuhr, Structure of Nations and Empires, 4–6; Lovin, 59–60.
31Lovin, 4.

need by nature.32 As Lovin rightly points out, states are a great good insofar as they
provide peace, security, and justice, for we need these things. But human nature is
shaped by and answers to something beyond the state, and humility about states’
capabilities is needed too.
So again, in a Christian realist framework, states are not ultimate ends, and they
do not deserve ultimate loyalty. For Niebuhr, those states which seek to place checks
on power and do justice where possible should certainly be recognized for the relative
good they can do.33 Yet no state is ever above critique. For one thing, even with the
great power they do have, no state is powerful enough to guarantee the precise
outcomes of its actions. Intentions may be good and state authorities may act with a
reasonable inclination toward justice, yet their plans may still easily go awry. Especially
in foreign policy, there are simply too many factors that determine the outcome of an
action for governing authorities to be confident that they can accomplish all they set out
to do. This does not excuse leaders from acting to secure justice and peace as best
they can, but their power is limited and must be wielded with appropriate humility.34
Secondly, no state is free of sinfulness and collective egoism. Abuse of power is
common; hence Christian realists’ concern for a balance of power so that those who
wield it are subject to oversight. Even more insidiously, virtues and ideals quickly
become vices when states pursue them by the wrong means or are over-confident in
their own innocence and virtue.35 The use of political power, even to promote goods
like peace, stability, and equality, is not possible without moral compromise, and it is
quite easy for compromise to shade into a failure to promote those goods at all.
In short, while political institutions are needed to organize human life together,
humility about the ability of states to do justice is required. States ought to be pushed to
promote human good, but individuals should not be tempted to idolize the state (their
own particular state, or states in general) as the power that promotes this good. This
plays into a “self-deification” of the state, Niebuhr says, which claims more for itself than
it can possibly merit.36 For human governments or political institutions to claim they can
provide perfect justice, or to demand undivided loyalty, leads, at the extreme, to the
horrors of totalitarianism.37 Instead, human beings’ earthly loyalty is rightly divided
between various groups, people, and institutions, each performing their own proper
function to enhance human well-being. Christian realists have variously called these
“mandates,” “spheres,” and “contexts,”38 but the point is that multiple worldly institutions
promote human well-being, and people should support and show loyalty toward all of
these institutions in appropriate ways.

Contemporary idolatry of the state
32Ibid., 8.
33Niebuhr, Nature and Destiny, Vol. 1, 213–4.
34Niebuhr, Irony 69, 72, 74–7.
35Ibid., 133.
36Niebuhr, Nature and Destiny Vol. 1, 211, 213.
37Lovin, 4; Elshtain, Sovereignty, 243.

Unfortunately, many of the idolatrous tendencies against which Niebuhr and the
Christian realist tradition warn are on display in our current moment. The “America first”
slogan and policies exemplified by the Trump administration in the United States, and
the “Britain first” attitude that accompanied the “Brexit” campaign in the United Kingdom,
have been two of the most striking recent examples of political leadership elevating
narrowly-defined interests of a state above all other considerations, including the moral
ideals Niebuhr points to as a proper check on state arrogance. At the same time, there
has been a rise of outspoken nationalism, where leaders idolize not just the institution of
the state but an imagined ethnically and religiously rooted “nation-state.”39
Niebuhr thinks that a shared feeling of “nationhood” can help bond people in
political community, and thus can help states maintain a measure of peace by
promoting unity.40 Yet national fellow-feeling, Niebuhr says, easily becomes sinful
idolatry of the nation and the state in which it holds power. Nationalism also wrongfully
foments disdain for anyone who is not part of the national group; governing authorities
who buy into this idolatry frequently commit injustice against real or perceived
outsiders.41 In Myanmar, not only the Rohingya but also the Karen, Chin, and other
minority groups have been forcibly relocated and targeted for government violence. In
the United States, idolatry of a white, Christian nation manifested in attacks on
immigrants by the Trump administration, including the “Muslim ban,” generating
misleading statistics to falsely paint immigrants as criminals, separation of children from
asylum-seeking parents, and using the COVID-19 pandemic as an excuse to shut down
the asylum system without any solid public health justification.
Even people who reject the worst excesses of nationalism, however, are in a sense
forced into dependence on and loyalty to the state, simply because states do have
overwhelming power that cannot be significantly mitigated by other kinds of institutions.
It is certainly true, and much-discussed among scholars, that multinational corporations
present challenges to state power on specific issues.42 But population flows, foreign aid,
and management of conflict and diplomacy continue to fall almost entirely under control
of states. This is proper and understandable in one sense: modern states have long
been understood to have absolute or near-absolute power in these areas, and the
global order operates under that assumption. But it presents a problem for Christian
realists when states use their power as often to inhibit justice as to promote it. Again, in
contrast to political realists, Christian realists critique political institutions based on the
moral ideal of God’s command to love. In earthly terms, this entails pushing governing
authorities and institutions to do justice for all people.
In the current moment, a Christian realist critique of the power and loyalty
enjoyed by the state, at the expense of other institutions and often to the harm of
individuals and families, is justified. The imbalance of power between the state and
other entities means that not only is justice often denied, but even basic aid is
38Lovin, 151; Bonhoeffer, Ethics, 204ff.
39See, for example, Chatterji, Hansen, and Jaffrelot, Majoritarian State; Whitehead and Perry, Taking
America Back for God.
40Niebuhr, Moral Man, 83–4.
41Niebuhr, Irony 91; Nature and Destiny, Vol. 1, 209–11.
42For one analysis, see Nester’s, Globalization, Wealth, and Power in the Twenty-First Century,
especially pp. 10–12 and 170.

sometimes withheld. Major humanitarian initiatives depend on the political will of the
world’s four or five most influential states,43 and as we have said, it is quite easy for one
or two states to deny humanitarian access to large populations.
Idolatry of the state and an imbalance of power between the state and other
institutions is not just a problem for individuals and communities, however. The
legitimacy of states themselves is impacted by their failure to protect minority and other
groups. One reason given for the importance of strong, sovereign states – by politicians,
scholars, and recently the U.S. State Department44 – is that states need “strong
government institutions” to enhance their populations’ well-being and protect them from
external threats.45 When the governments of states make and uphold laws that do
protect people, this makes sense. But if authorities instead neglect, persecute, or kill
people over whom they have power, while arguing that state sovereignty allows them to
act as they choose, they undermine the claim that human protection is best served in a
global order where states enjoy overwhelming power. Furthermore, the world’s more
powerful states have often undermined the sovereignty and self-determination of less
powerful states when it suited them, for instance during the many proxy wars imposed
on states of the “third world” during the Cold War. So an idolatry of the state as an
institution can incorporate, ironically, the undermining of some states’ sovereign power
by other states.

Beyond idolatry: feminist and postcolonial insights on sovereignty
and relationality
Christian realist thought articulates how contemporary idolatry of the state poses a
problem even for the limited and approximate justice that Christian realists seek. This
idolatry is especially worrisome when it is infused with idolatry of a “nation-state,” in
which state governments are assumed to protect and uplift one particular ethnic, racial,
or religious group at the expense of others. That said, the modern institution of the state
is not going away anytime soon. For the foreseeable future, states will almost certainly
continue to enjoy overweening power, and other institutions will be unable to check
them is use of state power or even provide humanitarian aid to oppressed groups. In
addition to this practical consideration, scholars who analyze the state and its sovereign
power face a theoretical dilemma. As Jens Bartelson has noted, critique of the state has
been around for a very long time. Yet political thinkers are far from finding common
ground even on the nature of the state and its authority, let alone what a critical
perspective can accomplish.46
So how can Christian realists continue to critique idolatry of the state, and find more
adequate ways of analyzing state sovereignty and power? Feminist insights into
Christian realism offer one way forward, pointing scholars toward a more vigorous
43Theresa Reinold makes an intriguing argument along these lines in Sovereignty and the Responsibility
to Protect. Reinold critiques the reliance of the global human rights regime on U.S. power and willingness
to advocate for human rights norms, yet concludes that if the Responsibility to Protect principle is to gain
traction, the U.S. must still play the primary role in promoting it.
44Commission on Unalienable Rights 33.
45Amstutz, “Two Theories of Immigration”; Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 53–4.
46Jens Bartelson, The Critique of the State, 2–5.

Christian realist understanding of contemporary justice that arises in
conversation with feminist and postcolonial scholarship. Feminist thinkers like Jean
Bethke Elshtain, Rebekah Miles, and Caron Gentry have begun to push Christian
realism beyond its traditional focus on “great powers” and the weighing and balancing of
interests. These scholars offer a more nuanced – a more realistic! – understanding of
the nature of human community, by incorporating the recognition that human beings are
creative, relational beings with the ability to cultivate bonds of love and cooperation
among social groups.
I will describe some of Elshtain, Miles, and Gentry’s insights in this last third of
the paper and then argue, with their work in mind, that conceptions of relational agency
described in contemporary feminist and postcolonial thought can fruitfully inform a
Christian realist critique of the idolatry of the state. I specifically draw on Sharon
Krause’s work on personal sovereignty and agency to articulate a relational conception
of state sovereignty and agency. Increased attention in Christian realist thought to
human beings’ fundamentally relational nature can inform a more nuanced
understanding of the nature of states, thus enhancing critique of idolatry of the state and
more fully recognizing the crucial role of cooperation among people and institutions in
promoting well-being.

Feminist critique of Christian realist thought
Christian realist scholars who examine the influence of gender ideology on political
thought have pushed the field of Christian realism to expand the range of its views on
human nature and on the social and political order. I refer to these scholars as feminist
thinkers, though Elshtain in particular has a complicated relationship with the term.
Feminist thinkers have encouraged Christian realists to better recognize how the uses
of political power impact small communities and individuals, especially women. They
also provide Christian realism with an analysis of how social power is negotiated not
only in the arena of reasoned justice, but also within relationships of care and empathy.
Feminist critique of Niebuhrian Christian realism goes back to Valerie Saiving’s 1960
essay “The Human Situation: A Feminine View.”47 After the essay was republished in
1979 in Carol P. Christ’s and Judith Plaskow’s Womanspirit Rising,48 feminist
theologians began to consider it in earnest. Plaskow applied a lens of women’s
experience specifically to Niebuhr’s ethics in Sex, Sin and Grace in 1980.49 Prominent
theologians, including Catherine Keller50 and Beverly Wildung Harrison,51 recognized
the influence and insight into public affairs that Niebuhr enjoyed, while pointing out
Niebuhr’s sexism and his tendency to overlook women’s experiences, particularly in the
“private” sphere, and thus his incomplete-at-best depiction of human nature, sin, and
grace.
Jean Bethke Elshtain was arguably the most prominent scholar in this period to
incorporate feminist insights into a sustained Christian realist project. Elshtain follows
47Saiving, “The Human Situation: A Feminine View.”
48Christ and Plaskow, Womanspirit Rising. Saiving’s essay is on pp. 25–42.
49Plaskow, Sex, Sin and Grace. Her major critiques of Niebuhr are on pp. 63–73 and 83–94.
50Keller, From a Broken Web, 39–43.
51Harrison, Making the Connections, 27–8.

Niebuhr in asserting that, when subject to limits and critique, political sovereignty
promotes human well-being.52 She expands the boundaries of Christian realist thought,
however, with her deep appreciation for the local and communal. Elshtain argues that
scholars cannot divorce conceptions of personal, state, and God’s sovereignty.53 She
attends carefully to individual and local experiences of political issues, including
successes and failures of grassroots networks and organizers.54 Sovereignty and the
international order are important themes in Elshtain’s work, but she does not view the
state as the only locus of justice. She analyzes power and agency of human
communities at different levels of political life.
More recently, Rebekah Miles’s “feminist Christian realism”55 retains a
Niebuhrian framework while drawing on feminist insights to rebalance Niebuhr’s overemphasis on human freedom. Miles appreciates the creativity and room for self-critique
that Niebuhr’s concepts of a transcendent God and human self-transcendence can
provide.56 But feminist thought, she argues, critiques and modifies Niebuhr’s Christian
realism by shows how human beings are bound to nature and community. Community,
in fact, has its own moral valence. Miles contends that feminist thought helps
Niebuhrian Christian realism more fully and accurately describe how the moral life is
shaped in networks of connection to others and the natural world. These networks do
not regulate our actions in a deterministic way, but they provide the bounded context
within which human freedom acts as a transformative power.57
Caron Gentry argues that emotion – specifically love – shapes relationships between
political groups and motivates political action. Gentry applauds Niebuhr’s Christian
realist analysis of human fallibility, his recognition that political power is both necessary
for doing justice in human life and a source of temptation to sin, and his critique of
nationalism.58 Yet Niebuhr, Gentry says, does not take into account the role of love as a
cause of political action. Based on feelings of love for others, human beings can
cultivate relationships that spark creative action to uplift people who are most
vulnerable.59 Recognition of human sinfulness and the need to constrain power through
checks and balances remains essential. But, Gentry says, relationships between
communities, including between states, are not only about reasoning out a balance of
justice between antagonists; they are dynamic bonds, involving vulnerability and
receptivity.

State sovereignty and relational agency
With these critiques from feminist Christian realist scholars in mind, I turn to the
work of Sharon Krause, a political philosopher whose work draws on feminist and
postcolonial scholarship. Krause challenges common conceptions of sovereignty and
agency of the individual, and relates conceptions of individual sovereignty to that of the
52Elshtain, Sovereignty: God, State, and Self, 147–8, 158.
53Elshtain, Sovereignty, x, xiii–xv.
54Elshtain, Jane Addams and the Dream of American Democracy.
55Miles, The Bonds of Freedom, 3.
56Ibid., 151–2.
57Ibid., 147, 155.
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state.60 Her work thus provides a lens through which Christian realist thinkers can
comprehend state sovereignty and agency in more nuanced ways and develop a more
effective critique of idolatry of the state.
Idolatry of the state as the center of power and loyalty presents a temptation
partly because states are indeed powerful: they have final say in protecting rights,
guarding borders, and going to war, among other things. They shape both global order
and their internal affairs. And as we have seen, they certainly have the power to
oppress vulnerable populations and keep other institutions from meaningfully
addressing that oppression. But if we draw out the implications of Krause’s examination
of personal sovereignty and agency, we see that the power of states to shape the world
and even their internal affairs only goes so far. Sovereignty does include selfdetermination and control over a population and territory, but in practice these powers
are not absolute. The agency of states – their ability to use their sovereign power to get
the effects they want – is in fact regulated and modified by the complicated network of
relationships in which they are involved.61 Not only other states and global institutions,
but also local and transnational grassroots groups, have the power to impact how states
act and what effects their actions have. This point shores up Christian realist insights
about the limits of state power and the need for humility, and then pushes them further.
For Christian realist thinkers who wish to challenge idolatry of the state, a clearer
description of the limits of states’ agency can help break down ideologies of the state
that contribute to idolatry, which in turn can promote engagement of states with other
groups and institutions toward just ends.
In her work Freedom Beyond Sovereignty, Krause accurately describes the most
common ideology of state sovereignty thus: sovereignty is control, the ability to
determine what happens within the state’s domain with no interference from outside
entities.62 For Krause, this understanding of state sovereignty provides the basis
for standard liberal notions of individual sovereignty and agency. Supposedly, to
exercise agency, people must possess individual sovereignty: they must be able to
control their actions and the effects of those actions without outside interference.
Krause argues, however, that human beings’ actual experience does not conform to this
conception of agency. Instead, people exercise “non-sovereign agency.”63 The effects of
60Postcolonial critiques of state sovereignty from a number of different angles can be found in scholarship in
international relations, political philosophy, and theology. See Bruyneel, The Third Space of Sovereignty; Dhawan,
Decolonizing Enlightenment; Farrier, Postcolonial Asylum; Hansen and Stepputat, Sovereign Bodies; Stenner,
Globalizing Morocco; Tinker, American Indian Liberation. I draw from Krause’s work because its discussion of
relational agency intersects in fruitful ways with Christian realist conceptions of human agency, particularly in light of
feminist critique.
61While Krause’s work is indebted to and arguably falls within the scope of feminist as well as postcolonial thought, I
consider Freedom Beyond Sovereignty in the context of postcolonial scholarship due to Krause’s concern for
reevaluating liberalism, sovereignty, and democratic theory in light of power relationships that impact the agency of
subjects, especially marginalized subjects, and that shape how subjects and communities are understood by others.
In this way Krause continues in the tradition of foundational postcolonial scholars Edward Said and Gayatri Spivak.
See, for example, Said, The Selected Works of Edward Said, 1966-2006; Spivak, A Critique of Postcolonial Reason
62Krause, Freedom Beyond Sovereignty, 2.
63Krause distinguishes her concept of non-sovereign agency from the more-familiar “relational autonomy,” a concept
which has played a significant role in feminist thought. See, for instance, Mackenzie and Stoljar, Relational
Autonomy; Oshana, Personal Autonomy and Social Oppression; Veltman and Piper, Autonomy, Oppression, and
Gender. Krause asserts that relational autonomy is concerned with individual choices rooted in relationships,
whereas her own work examines agency as a socially distributed phenomenon. Krause, Freedom Beyond
Sovereignty, 12.

our actions are not under our full control; they rely on perceptions, words, and actions of
others. Agency is socially distributed, and other people are “integral” to the agency of a
given individual. Other people or groups take up and give full meaning to an individual’s
actions, whether simply by recognizing or understanding those actions, by amplifying or
silencing them, or by building on or rejecting them.64
In practice, the social distribution of agency means that human beings have both more
and less responsibility for our actions than the concept of sovereign agency implies. If
the impacts of our actions, including speech as well as activity, are (sometimes)
amplified by others, then our responsibility ripples out through multiple interpretations of
and responses to our actions. Furthermore, each of us acts within a network of
relationships of power, including power conferred or denied under conditions of
inequality driven by racism, sexism, nationalism, and so on. We did not individually
cause these conditions, but if agency is socially distributed then each person bears
some share of responsibility for their actions under such conditions.65 At the same time,
people cannot justly be held fully responsible for speech and actions whose effects are
not entirely within their control. Our responsibility is diffused because we cannot be
completely liable for whatever someone else might do once our actions have made their
way into the world.66 This is an expansive notion of responsibility that strives to take
more fully into account the broad set of circumstances in which a person acts. What we
do matters, and we remain responsible for it, especially if we enjoy a relatively high level
of social power and thus do have more complete control over the results of our actions.
Yet our responsibility, and our agency, play out in a web of social relationships.
So Krause rejects the application of a concept of sovereignty, drawn from the
modern idea of state sovereignty, to individuals. But her argument works in reverse as
well. Krause argues that human beings exercise a non-sovereign form of agency; states
too, though indeed sovereign, nevertheless exercise agency only within networks of
relationships. That states are sovereign does not mean they have complete selfdetermination and control over territory and population. Sovereignty as it exists in our
Christian realist thought has certainly recognized the limits of states’ sovereignty,
agency, and power – we recall Niebuhr’s work in Irony as well as Lovin’s discussion of
the power of multinational corporations and the thought of his “Pluralist Realists.” But
Christian realist thought has tended to say that states’ agency and power are subject to
appropriate constraints because we live in a sinful world. While these constraints can
indeed hold unjust use of power in check, I propose that limitations on the agency of
states arise not only or even primarily because of sin, but because human beings are
fundamentally created as social, relational beings. That is to say, limitations on the
exercise of sovereignty are not simply a consequence of the sinfulness of human
communities that necessitates a balance of power; they arise from the nature of social
life itself.
Therefore, governing authorities best promote human well-being when they take
responsibility for acting within networks of individuals and institutions. Intentions toward
good governance can best be fulfilled if decision-makers do not seek complete control
over the effects of their words and actions – which of course is impossible –but instead
64Krause, Freedom Beyond Sovereignty, 22.
65Ibid., 92.
66Ibid., 92–3.

act with clear attention to how their words and actions are taken up by others or how
they might justly amplify the actions of others, including grassroots communities as well
as political institutions. With reference to the examples below, this might mean favoring
conversation and negotiation with grassroots activist movements over repressive
actions whenever possible, or clearly-articulated public discussion of data on “push/pull”
factors for immigration, in order to best cooperate with other countries and provide a
clear message for citizens about the reasoning behind border security or detention
policies.

Relational agency and transnational grassroots activism
The socially distributed, and limited, agency of states certainly comes to light in states’
relationships with each other, or when international institutions like the U.N. Security
Council or International Court of Justice influence states’ actions. But states’ exercise
of power is likewise limited by the agency of non-state sovereign nations; grassroots
and activist networks; and the choices of individuals and small groups, particularly (in
our current moment) immigrants. These sorts of limitations are less often discussed in
detail in Christian realist scholarship, but they can be as significant as constraints
imposed from the outside.
Native American tribes, who hold sovereignty yet are distinct from sovereign
states, have recently offered challenges that modify and limit the agency of the United
States government. They have done this by cultivating local as well as transnational
connections. From 2016 to 2020, members of the Tohono O’odham nation protested,
both alone and alongside environmental and human rights groups, against border wall
construction through tribal lands.67 Standing Rock Sioux, in a much-reported challenge
to both corporate and federal power, have since 2016 brought together members of
multiple tribes, environmental activists, clergy and religious groups, students, and
military veterans. Their coalition has used both protest and legal mechanisms to oppose
construction of the Dakota Access Pipeline. While the coalition’s fortunes have shifted
at times, in March 2020 a federal judge struck down permits for the pipeline and ordered
a full environmental review.68 The examples of these tribes show how groups that are
sovereign, but not states, create their own centers of power and loyalty. They also show
how states must navigate the relational nature of their agency and their inability to
exercise absolute power over populations, in the face of tribal nations and coalitions of
activists.
Transnational grassroots movements seeking racial and gender justice have
likewise built relationships that are not confined within the borders of states, and have
shown that the policies and activities of states filter through relationships not only with
their own populations, but also worldwide. For instance, U.S. federal elections are of
course extremely state-focused; their purpose is to select governing authorities for the
state. But when the Women’s March of January 2017 arose relatively spontaneously
after the election of Donald Trump and brought out millions of people in approximately
67Carranza, “O’odham members block border wall,” and Kennedy-Howard, “No Ban, No Wall.”
68Beitsch, “Court sides with tribes in Dakota Access Pipeline case.”

615 U.S. cities and towns and 261 cities and towns outside the U.S.,69 it turned out that
the election gave rise not only to a change in U.S. political leadership, but also to a
global movement for justice for women and others, and against the type of idolatrous
nationalism that Trump and his administration embraced. In the aftermath, women in the
U.S. were inspired to run for office and create new local movements, and women
worldwide drew on the energy of the protests to enhance activism aimed at rights for
women – and more – in their own countries.70 Transnational movements also connected
activists in the wake of the killing of George Floyd and reinvigoration of Black Lives
Matter protests in May 2020.71 As Kwok Pui-Lan has pointed out, these movements
draw on social media – for all its faults – to connect people in ways that are not fully
under the control of the states they live in.72
The current state of international migration provides an even more poignant
example of tensions between an ideology of the state as fully in control of its own
territory and population, and the reality of the limits of states’ agency in the face of mass
migration by individuals and families, especially those driven by violence or economic
hardship. A great deal of the rhetoric employed by contemporary ultra-nationalist
politicians and parties has to do with punishing irregular migration, keeping asylum
seekers out, and otherwise limiting immigration, particularly from certain areas of the
world. Examples include anti-immigrant rhetoric and policies of the Trump
administration in the U.S. and anti-immigrant arguments made by U.K. politicians in
support of “Brexit.” And again to mention Myanmar, its government classifies the
Rohingya as illegal immigrants from Bangladesh as part of its campaign against them.73
And yet despite the promises to “build a wall” to keep immigrants out or “take
back control” of immigration, no country can keep out all immigrants, or even all
immigrants it deems undesirable. In the United States, there were approximately 10.5
million undocumented immigrants in 2017,74 while Immigration and Customs
Enforcement removed just over 265,000 immigrants in 2018 and 267,000 in 2019.75
Hundreds of thousands more people continue to arrive in the U.S. without
documentation each year,76 and studies indicate that border enforcement has, if any,
only short-term deterrent effects.77 And as long as there are wars and gang violence
there will be asylum-seekers; meanwhile, climate change only exacerbates the number
of people who must flee their native countries each year.78
69The best estimate of the number of cities and marches involved in the 2017 Women’s March was conducted
by political scientists Jeremy Pressman and Erica Chenoweth and tabulated on a publicly-available
spreadsheet at https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1xa0iLqYKz8×9Yc_rfhtmSOJQ2EG
geUVjvV4A8LsIaxY/htmlview#gid=0, accessed September 4, 2020. Chenoweth and Pressman discussed their
work in the Washington Post article, “This Is What We Learned by Counting the Women’s Marches.”
70North, “The Women’s Marches Are Shrinking. Their Influence Isn’t.” Herrera, “Global Women’s Marches
persevere.”
71Cave, Albeck-Ripka, and Magra, “Huge Crowds around the Globe March in Solidarity against Police
Brutality.”
72Kwok, “Postcolonial Intervention in Political Theology,” 224.
73Akins, “The Two Faces of Democratization in Myanmar,” 238–41.
74Kamarck and Stenglein. “How many undocumented immigrants are in the United States and who are they?”
75Immigration and Customs Enforcement, “ICE Statistics.”
76Kamarck and Stenglein.
77Massey, Durand, and Pren, “Why Border Enforcement Backfired,” 1557–8.
78United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Climate change and disaster displacement.”

Controlling borders and population is considered a quintessential aspect of state
self-determination, yet in reality, states’ ability to control these things is limited by other
states’ ability or inability to protect their populations, by the determination of migrants to
find security or join family, and even by the earth’s climate. States themselves have
begun recognizing that they cannot deal individually with increased migration. The 164
countries who signed the Global Compact for Migration (the United States was not one)
seemed to agree that only a network of cooperation between countries, businesses,
educational institutions, and NGOs would have sufficient scope to facilitate safe and
orderly migration that spreads benefits and burdens among countries while upholding
the well-being of migrants. The Compact insists that it honors the sovereignty of
states,79 and it cannot force states into specific actions. Yet even as a pledge of
voluntary cooperation, it shows that most state authorities understand that the forces of
global migration limit and shape every state’s ability to control who enters its borders.
The development of the Global Compact for Migration is just one small step, but it hints
at a conception of the state that is both less idolatrous and more realistic than that of
many contemporary political leaders. Certainly, it is more realistic than an ultranationalist ideology that seeks the interest of a state in a narrowly defined way. But it is
more realistic even than a Niebuhrian-style Christian realist notion of states’ sovereign
agency. Contemporary Christian realism obviously recognizes the dangers of
nationalism and understands the limitations and ironies of state actions. But a further
step in analyzing, and refusing, the temptation to make an idol of the state becomes
clear in conversation with feminist and postcolonial thought. Limitations on the agency
of individual states do not arise only because of human sin; instead, many arise
naturally out of the relationality of human beings and our communities. The state is not
all-powerful and cannot be, because its agency will always be limited by the
relationships it cannot help but have, with individuals and small communities as well as
other states.
From a Christian realist perspective, absolute human loyalty rightly lies with the
God who participates in and comprehends all relationships, not with any single
institution. In this world, human loyalty should not be devoted to just one institution but
should be spread across networks of relationships and communities, all of which have
their ultimate end in God. These insights are better articulated by Christian realism
when it incorporates insights from feminist and postcolonial thought. Especially as the
connectedness of our world becomes more obvious with the impact of climate change,
technology, and increased migration, the conversation between these areas of
scholarship is sorely needed.
79United Nations, Global Compact for Migration, 3.
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